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NOTES
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBER
INDIANS: THE LEGAL VOID AFTER DURO V. REINA
Douglas B. Cubberley*
Introduction
Native Americans continually struggle against domination to
retain legal and political autonomy as well as to preserve their
cultural uniqueness. Since the Marshall Court's Cherokee deci-
sions,' the Supreme Court has been the protector of tribal rights
against governmental encroachment on tribal sovereignty. Iron-
ically, as tribes begin to use more of their sovereign powers,
which lay dormant for over a century, the Supreme Court has
formulated a new policy to divest Indians of those powers. Duro
v. Reina2 is the latest in a series of cases putting new limitations
on Indian legal and political autonomy.
Although the federal government has vacillated between pol-
icies of assimilation and self-determination, the assimilationist
ideological justifications have remained relatively constant.3 His-
torically, judicial divestment of tribal criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians cannot be justified. In light of current
Congressional policies that foster tribal autonomy, the justifi-
cation for judicial divestment is not apparent. What is apparent,
however, is that the legal and political ramifications to the tribes
will be immediate and significant.4 This note examines the his-
torical context of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,
reviews the Duro decision, and discusses future options.
* Third-year law student, University of Oklahoma.
1. Two cases involving the Cherokee Nation have become known as the Cherokee
decisions. They are: Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
3. See generally Deloria, The Era of Self-Determination: An Overview, in INANw
Smy-RuLE: Fnm-HAND AccouNTs oF INDAw-Wnr RELATioNS FPoM RoosirvmT To RE-
AGAN 191-94 (K. Philp ed., 1985).
4. Within days of the Duro decision, Russell Means filed a motion to dismiss in
Navajo tribal court for an assault and battery charge. Daily Oklahoman, June 2, 1990, at
8, col. 1.
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Historical Roots of Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Nonmember Indians
Source of Tribal Sovereignty
Sovereignty is the power to make, administer and enforce
legl rules applicable to people and territory.- Indian sovereignty
is not a federal power; 6 it was not constitutionally or statutorily
created. The framework for recognition of Indian tribal sover-
eignty within the federal system is found in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's Cherokee decisions.7 Since the beginning of the Republic,
"Indian tribes consistently were considered as distinct, inde-
pendent political communities retaining their original natural
rights."" The power of self-government is inherent in the tribal
legal status.9
As long as tribes were complete and independent, tribal crim-
inal[ jurisdiction was similar to that of any sovereign nation.
Tribes could punish their citizens or any aliens within their
borders according to tribal customs. 0 However, tribal sover-
5. O'Connell, Tribal Sovereignty, INDIAN L. SUPPORT CENT REP., Feb., 1988, at
I (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
6. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896):
Although possessed of... attributes of local self-government, when exercising
their tribal functions, all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative
authority of the United States.... But the existence of the right in Congress
to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee nation
shall be exercised does not render such local powers federal powers arising
from and created by the Constitution of the United States.
7. See supra note 1. See also Bransky, Tribal Court Jurisdiction, INDIAN L. SUPPORT
CENmTE RaP., Dec. 1988, at 1.
8. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). See generally F. ConIEN,
HANBaooK op FrmERAL INIAN LAw (1982). Cohen explains that apart from the doctrine
of preemption the most significant factor is the role of tribal sovereignty within the federal
system:
Federal treaties and statutes have been consistently construed to reserve the
right of self-government to the tribes, and the Supreme Court has held that
this "tradition of sovereignty" is the "backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read." If the state laws were applied to
Indians in Indian country, retained self-government would be greatly restricted
and have little importance, its actual status in many circumstances outside
indian country. For this reason broad preemption of state laws in Indian
country has been consistently recognized as a necessary implication from the
federal policy protecting tribal sovereignty.
Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
9. Pipestem, The Mythology of the Oklahoma Indians Revisited: A Survey of the
Legal Status of Indians Ten Years Later, in AmNuAL SovmEmoNr SyaposiuM, § VI, at 9-
Pipestem (1988) (looseleaf collection of material presented at first annual training session,
held in Oklahoma City, Okla. on June 1-3, 1988).
10. F. CoHmN, supra note 8, at 146.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss1/7
NOTES
eignty is not absolute. 1 Marshall described the relationship be-
tween the federal government and a tribe as that of a "ward to
a guardian"; the tribe had a right to its land until that right
was extinguished by the federal government. 12 Until extinguished,
the Indian nations "were distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclu-
sive." 1 3
Three fundamental principles of modern tribal sovereignty are
derived from these early decisions: "(1) an Indian tribe possesses
... all powers of any sovereign state; (2) conquest ... termi-
nates the external powers of the sovereignty of the tribe ...
but does not itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe;
(3) these powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by
express legislation of Congress. 1' 4 These principles still affect
Indian tribes today and are still a source of debate. 5 Duro
debates the internal-external dichotomy of sovereignty in the
context of criminal jurisdiction.
Limitations on Tribal Sovereignty
Treaty Period
During the treaty period, several factors shaped the federal-
tribal relationship, diminishing tribal sovereignty. First, until the
end of this period, the government treated Indian tribes as
foreign governments. While treaties granted concessions to the
government, nonetheless, the tribes continued to be viewed as
autonomous sovereign nations. Second, while the tribes won
legal protection from the Supreme Court against state intrusions
on their autonomy, they lost against federal policies of removal
and reservation. Third, only one criminal statute was enacted
during this period, which ensured that non-Indians would be
tried by anglo courts, not by the Indians. Finally, the rise of
the assimilationist ideology'6 and anglo demands for Indian lands
11. Bransky, supra note 7, at 2.
12. Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
13. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557.
14. F. CoNi, supra note 8, at 241. Further limitations are found in the federal
common law and tribal constitutions. O'Connell, Tribal Sovereignty, INDI L. SUPPoRT
CENTE REP., Feb., 1987, at 1, 3-6 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323
(1978)).
15. McSloy, American Indians and the Constitution: An Argument for Nationhood,
14 Am. INDiAN L. Rnv. 139 (1990). McSIoy discusses Congressional power over Indian
sovereignty and the lack of legal underpinnings for the exercise of that power from the
Constitution, treaty or international law.
16. Assimilation as an ideology grew out of the 19th century reform movement belief
that Indians should adopt the habits of civilization and be brought into the mainstream of
civilization. See generally F. ConmN, supra note 8, at 127-43.
No. 1]
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fostered policies that justified the government's increasing con-
trol over all facets of Indian life, bringing the treaty period to
an end.17
Between 177818 and 1871,19 the United States ratified 370
Indian treaties. 20 These treaties are accorded the same dignity as
that given to treaties with foreign governments. 2' Yet in recog-
nition of the unequal bargaining position of the tribe in the
federal trust relationship, they differ from foreign treaties in
two important ways.22 First, treaties are construed in favor of
the Indians.2Y Second, there must be a clear and specific showing
of the intent to abrogate, either in later legislation or treaties,
before courts will allow treaty abrogation. u
Until the last decade of the treaty-making period, treaties were
framed in the language of international diplomacy, which rec-
ognized tribal autonomy.Y Early treaties recognized Indians'
17. Id. at 128.
18. Treaty between the United States and the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
19. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)). The Act states, in pertinent part:
Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided,
further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or
impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with
any such Indian nation or tribe.
Id. at 566.
20. Note, Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: Testing the Limits of
Retained Sovereignty, 90 CoRNELu L. Ray. 89, 90 (1980).
21. United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876). See, e.g.,
Wasuigton v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979).
22. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "'As Long
as Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"--How Long a 77me Is That?, 63 C=n.
L. REv. 601, 617 (1975), reprinted in D. GmEcBs & G. WIUCERSON, supra note 22, at 63.
23. F. Coama, supra note 8, at 63. E.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
423, 431-32 (1943). See also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970)
(treatie should be construed as Indians would have understood them); McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (ambiguous expressions must be
resolved in favor of Indians). Similar favorable rules have been applied to agreements,
statutes and executive orders. F. ConmN, supra note 8, at 283.
24. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 63 (citing Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979)).
25. Cf., REPoRT OF ma Comm= Raou.ATrNo Tm INDlAN DEPARTmENT, H.R. REP.
No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-22 (1834). The report states, in pertinent part:
The right of self-government is secured to each tribe, with jurisdiction over
all persons and property within its limits, subject to certain exceptions,
founded on principles somewhat analogous to the international laws among
civilized nations.
Officers, and persons [in service in Indian Country] by treaty stipulations,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss1/7
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power to make war, peace and friendship, and mutual assistance
pacts. 26 Treaties included provisions fixing boundaries, providing
for passports, extradition, and even relations with third powers. 2
Some expressly recognized Indian jurisdiction over non-Indians
dwelling on Indian lands.28 Other treaties recognized that neither
nation would punish offenders who were citizens of the other
nation. 29
From 1776 to 1849, all treaty limitations upon tribal self-
government were in some way related to intercourse with non-
Indians. 0 Several treaties granted federal jurisdiction over crimes
must necessarily be placed under the protection, and subject to the laws of
the United States. To persons merely traveling in the Indian country the same
protection is extended.
As to those persons not required to reside in the Indian country, who
voluntarily go there to reside, they must be considered as voluntarily submit-
ting themselves to the laws of the tribes.
There is one other exception necessary to preserve peace among the tribes,
and a good understanding with the bordering States. A right is reserved to
the Governor to reprieve and the President to pardon, any member of another
tribe, or a citizen of the United States, who may be the Indian laws be
convicted of any capital offense. The danger of leaving the punishment of
death to the judgment of tribes who are not accustomed to measure degrees
of guilt, especially against other than members of the tribe, is too obvious
to need comment.
Id., reprinted in M. PsIcE, NATIVE AMEiucAN LAW MANUAL 465 (1970).
26. F. Co~mN, supra note 8, at 64-65.
27. Id. at 65 & n.36. E.g., Treaty with the Kioways, Ka-ta-kas, and Ta-wa-ka-ros,
May 26, 1837, art. 9, 7 Stat. 533, 535 (recognizing relations between the tribes and the
Republic of Mexico); Treaty with the Comanches and Witchetaws, Aug. 24, 1835, art. 9,
7 Stat. 474, 475 (recognizing friendly relations between those tribes and the Republic of
Mexico). The provision for relations with Mexico in both treaties is interesting in light of
the fact that both were entered into several years after Marshall's pronouncement of tribal
dependency in Worcester.
28. See, e.g., Treaty with the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawas, Chippewas,
Putawatimes, Miamias, Eel-river, Weeas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias, Aug.
3, 1975, art. VI, 7 Stat. 49, 52; Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. VIII, 7 Stat.
39, 40; Treaty with the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, art. VI, 7 Stat. 35, 36; Treaty with the
Shawnees, Jan. 31, 1786, art. VII, 7 Stat. 27; Treaty with the Chickasaws, Jan. 10, 1786,
art. IV, 7 Stat 25; Treaty with the Choctaws, Jan. 3, 1786, art. IV, 7 Stat. 22; Treaty with
the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, art. V, 7 Stat. 19; Treaty with the Wyandots, Delawares,
Chippewas, and Ottawas, Jan. 21, 1785, art. V, 7 Stat. 17. Note, supra note 17, at 90
n.12. See, e.g., M. PRicE & R. CLINTON, LAw AN THm AmnucAN INDIAN, 265-66 (2d ed.
1983).
29. Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13; F. CoHaN, supra note 8,
at 67 n.53.
30. F. Corona, supra note 8, at 68.
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committed by U.S. citizens in Indian Country,3 or granted state
and territorial jurisdiction over both Indians and non-Indians
committing interracial crimes of robbery or murder within Indian
territory. 2 Several treaties provided that the tribe consisted of
all persons in the community. 3
Later treaties, however, reflected an increased usurpation of
tribal powers, abandoning established distinctions between in-
ternal and external powers. 34 Some treaties explicitly delineated
tribal criminal jurisdiction.35 The most important intrusion into
tribal autonomy occurred in treaties after 1853, which allotted
tribal land. 6 These treaties reflected the federal government's
intent to terminate and assimilate tribes by weakening tribal
power.3 7 Moreover, intrusions occurred in treaties which gave
Congress or the President significant power over the tribes,'3
including the power to settle intertribal disputes39 and punish
intratribal crimes committed in Indian territory.4
31. Treaty with the Choctaws, Sept. 27, 1830, arts. 6-8, 7 Stat. 333-34; F. ConMN,
supra note 8, at 67 n.54.
32. Treaty with the Wiandots, Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pattawatimas, and
Sacs, Jan. 9, 1789, art. 5, 7 Stat. 28, 29. See F. ComiN, supra note 8, at 67 n.55.
33. Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478; Treaty with the
Choctaws, Sept. 27, 1830, art. 4, 7 Stat. 333; Treaty with the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, art.
8-9, 7 Stat. 35, 37; Treaty with the Shawnees, Jan. 31, 1786, art. 3, 7 Stat. 26.
34. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 69.
_;5. These provisions reflected tribal fear of losing their autonomy against state en-
croachment. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, July 19, 1866, art. XIII, 14 Stat. 799,
803, which provided:
Mhe judicial tribunals of the [Cherokee] nation shall be allowed to retain
exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising within their country
in which members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only
parties, or where the cause of action shall arise in the Cherokee nation, except
as otherwise provided in this treaty.
See also Treaty with the Pottawatomie, Feb. 27, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 531. Treaties
with the Creeks, Seminoles, Choctaws and Chickasaws contained a provision recognizing
the tribes' "unrestricted tight of self-government, and full jurisdiction, over persons and
property, within their respective limits; excepting, however, all ... white persons, or
otherwise, members of... [t]he tribe." Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles Tribes, Aug.
7, 1836, art. XV, 11 Stat. 703-04. This provision can also be found in Treaty with the
Choctaws and Chickasaws, June 22, 1855, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611-13.
36. F. ConHE, supra note 8, at 69 n.66.
37. Id. at 98-99. Cf. DocumENTs oF UNrrED STATES INDLrN PoLicY 89, 89-92 (F.
Prucha 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter INDLAN PoUcy] (doc. no. 62, an extract from the Annual
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1856).
38. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 66, nn. 41, 42.
39. See, e.g., Treaty with the O'Gallala Indians, Oct. 28, 1865, art. 3, 14 Stat. 747-
48; Camment, Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians on Reservation, 1980 ARz. ST. L.
REv. 727, 739 n.77. See also F. ConEN, supra note 8, at 98-102.
4). Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles, Aug. 7, 1856, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699, 703-
04; Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, June 22, 1855, art. 7, 11 Stat. 622, 612.
F. CoHEN, supra note 8, 67 n.55.
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It cannot be inferred from these later treaties that the federal
government gained jurisdiction over all intertribal crimes.4' An
attorney general's opinion supported Indian jurisdiction over
Indian against Indian crimes42 and, in reviewing this period, the
Supreme Court held that it became the settled policy of Congress
to permit Indian against Indian offenses to be dealt with ac-
cording to tribal customs and laws.43 It is inconceivable that the
government had implicit jurisdiction over all intertribal crimes
when it was unable to fulfill its explicit treaty terms, such as
policing territorial borders against anglo encroachment and vi-
olence. 44 Therefore, these later treaties only reflect the Interior
41. One commentator points out that prior to 1789, treaty provisions regarding federal
jurisdiction spoke in generalities of Indians, i.e., offenses committed between Indians and
United States citizens, while later treaties provided for federal jurisdiction over offenses by
or against tribal member. See Comment, supra note 39, at 737-38. From these 23 latter
type of treaties, the commentator infers that Congress intended to clearly assume jurisdiction
over intertribal crimes. This only accounts for one-tenth of the treaties made; others do
not include this language. Without explicit language, the federal government has not assumed
jurisdiction over those tribes. At best, these treaty provisions point to inconsistencies in the
government's Indian treaty writing and varied intentions of the writers.
42. An attorney general's opinion rendered in 1855 assured the Choctaw nation of
their exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes. 7 Op. Att'y Gen.
174, 180 (1855). The opinion states, in pertinent part:
The United States assure to the Choctaw Nation "the jurisdiction and gov-
ernment of all the persons and property which may be within their limits
west, * * and secure said Choctaw Nation from and against all laws except
such as from time to time may be enacted in their own national councils,
not inconsistent with the constitution, treaties and laws of the United States,
and except such as may be, and which have been, enacted by Congress, to
the extent that Congress, under the Constitution, are required to exercise a
legislation over Indian affairs." ... Can there be anything more explicit?
The general rule is competency of the local jurisdiction, saving exceptions.
Exception is to be shown. If a thing be not taken out by exception, it remains
in the general rule....
... [Congress] has legislated, in so far as it saw fit, by taking jurisdiction
in criminal matters [over non-Indians], and omitting to take jurisdiction in
civil matters.
Id. But see Comment, supra note 39, at 737-40.
43. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 604 (1916).
44. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 64 (quoting L. Scm cKEma, TES OFacE oF
INDtAN AFFA RS 62 (1927)).
One of the defects of the treaty system was that agreements were
continually being made which were not carried into effect. This was due
in part to inefficient administration, in part to the failure of Congress to
make the necessary appropriations, and in part to the inherent difficulties
presented by the nature of the problem. ...
Some of the stipulations of almost all treaties which it was impossible
to carry out were those guaranteeing the Indians against the intrusion of
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
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Department's increased control over criminal matters involving
Indian intercourse with non-Indians.
Notwithstanding the Marshall court's Cherokee decisions, po-
litical forces in the federal government prevailed over Indian
interests and many Indian tribes lost their lands to removal and
reservation, which, as early as 1830, became the official policy
of the government. 45 These policies grew in response to demands
for more Indian land for settlement. Removing Indians to re-
servations was perceived as a method of civilization and assim-
ilation.46 Later, however, reservations were viewed as a way to
exercise "strict reformatory control" and to isolate the Indians
from the settlers. 47 Yet increasing pressure to open the reserva-
tions to commercial exploitation and settlement led to the demise
of these policies. 48
Only one statute dealt with criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country.49 As originally promulgated, the Trade and Intercourse
the white settlers and providing for the punishment of white persons
committing offenses against the Indians. As to the exterior boundaries
reserved to the Indians were thousands of miles of extent, it was impossible
to police this area in such a way as to prevent trespass or to secure evidence
against offenders.
Id. Cf. INDLNr PoLicy, supra note 37, at 89-92 (from doe. no. 62, an extract from the
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1856).
45. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 122.
46. In 1851, Commissioner Lea stated that "if timely measures were taken for the
proper location and management of these tribes, they may, at no distant period, become
an intelligent and Christian people," leading to their ultimate incorporation into the
great body of our citizen population. Id. at 123 n.474.
47. In 1872, Commissioner Walker viewed the reservation as a place where Indians
were "under a strict reformatory control by the agents of the Government" and isolated
them from "influences inimical to peace and virtue." Id. at 125 n.488.
43. Id. at 132-33. Commissioner Walker stated that when Indians abandoned their
"roving state" and became agriculturists, they would need less reservation land, and
the surplus could be sold to non-Indians. Id. at 125 n.489.
49. Indian Country was first defined in the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act. Section
1 states:
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within
the State of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and,
also that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not
within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for
the purposes of this act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.
1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729.
This definitiofi was omitted from the 1874 revision of the act. Also, a statutory
definition was finally enacted in 1948, which states:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the
term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss1/7
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Act of 1790,50 sections 5 and 6, provided for federal jurisdiction
over non-Indians committing crimes in "any town, settlement
or territory belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians." 51
Despite several reenactments, Congress declined to add intertri-
bal crimes to its jurisdiction.52
As amended in 1817, 53 section 2 excepted crimes "committed
by one Indian against another, within any Indian boundary."
In enacting the 1817 Act, Congress intended to exclude Indian
against Indian crime from federal jurisdiction, 54 without distin-
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all independent
Indian communities within the boarders [sic] of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. III 1946). For a discussion of the definition of Indian Country,
see F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 27-31.
50. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
51. F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 110-11.
52. See also Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469, which included a new
provision making Indians who crossed state or territorial lines and committing certain
enumerated crimes liable under federal law. It also provided for concurrent tribal
jurisdiction. F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 112 n.401. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2
Stat. 139, § 21, 2 Stat. 139, 146, carried forward the previous provisions and added
the prohibition against liquor sales to Indians. This act was amended again by Act of
May 6, 1822, ch. 54, 3 Stat. 679. Revisions 32 years later, in Act of Mar. 27, 1854,
ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270, added the tribal punishment and treaty exceptions. The
current statute has not been substantially amended since 1854. F. COHEN, supra note 8,
at 288.
53. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 2, 3 Stat. 383. The act stated that it should
not be construed "to affect any treaty now in force" with any Indian tribe. Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1834) which stated:
In consequence of the change in our Indian relations, the laws relating to
crimes committed in the Indian country, and to the tribunals before whom
offenders are to be tried, require revision, By the act of 3d March, 1817,
the criminal laws of the United States were extended to all persons in
Indian country, without exception, and by that act, as well as that 30th
March, 1802, they might be tried wherever apprehended. It will be seen
that we cannot, consistently with the provisions of some of our treaties,
and of the territorial act, extend our criminal laws to offenses committed
by or against Indians, of which the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction; and
it is rather of courtesy than of right that we undertake to punish crimes
committed in that territory by and against our own citizens. And this
provision is retained principally on the ground that it may be unsafe to
trust to Indian law in the early stages of their Government. It is not
perceived that we can with any justice or propriety extend our laws to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
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guishing between intratribal and intertribal crime. In construing
the reworded 1834 Act, 5 the Supreme Court held that it "does
not speak of members of a tribe but of the race generally, of
the family of Indians, and it is intended to leave them, both as
regards their own tribe and other tribes also, to be governed by
Indian usage and customs.' '56
Subsequent revisions made no distinction between tribal mem-
bers and nonmembers.5 7 Congress had many opportunities to
make an intertribal distinction or expand federal criminal juris-
diction to encompass intertribal crimes. When viewed in entirety,
the history surrounding treaty-making and the Trade and Inter-
course Act, as viewed by contemporaries of that period, points
to an acknowledged lack of federal jurisdiction over intertribal
offenses committed by Indians against Indians, at any place within their
own limits.
Id., reprinted in F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 116-17 n.437 (emphasis original).
:55. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729. The act provides:
That so much of the laws of the United States as provides for the
punishment of crimes committed within any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall be in force in the Indian
country: Provided, The same shall not extend to crimes committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian.
Id. at 733.
56. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846). The Court stated
a white man adopted by the Indians, while remaining amenable to the criminal juris-
diction of the United States, may, by becoming entitled to certain privileges in the tribe,
"make himself amenable to their laws and usages." Id. at 573. Cf., F. COHEN, supra
note 8, at 338-39 (act did not limit tribal authority over offenses covered by the Act,
public policy of the period respected tribal self-government, and due to remoteness of
tribes from federal authority, tribes were left to themselves with little interference.) See
also Crimes Committed by Indians, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 184-85 (1854) (concurrent
juriseiction of the federal government and Indian tribe over an adopted white man);
Note, supra note 17, at 94-95; M. PIUcE & R. CLINTON, supra note 28, at 208-12.
57. The current statute, known as the Indian Country Crimes Act, provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law
of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
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crimes, despite the desires of government officials or the few
attempts under several treaties. 58
Crow Dog and the Major Crimes Act
The treaty period ended by enactment of the Appropriations
Act of March 3, 1871.59 The end of the treaty period was the
result of residual hostility of the Secretary of Interior over tribal
alliances with the Confederate States and the House of Repre-
sentatives' resentment of the Senate's exclusive power over In-
dian affairs.60 The Act terminated Indians' external sovereign
power to make treaties,61 but did not impair previously made
treaties,6 2 nor end the Indians' special status. The federal gov-
ernment continued to deal with Indians through agreements,
statutes, and executive orders, which had the same legal effect
as treaties. 63
The desire to assimilate Indians into anglo society strongly
influenced public policyA4 A major goal of the proponents was
58. No authority by statute was given to the executive branch to obtain jurisdiction
over intertribal crimes. Through rules of construction, if treaty rights are to be modified,
this must be stated in the language of the statute, Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 60
(1985); Leavenworth, L. & G.R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 740 (1875), or by
clear and reliable evidence in the legislative history of a statute. None was forthcoming
during this period. Federal executive officials are limited to the authority conferred on
them by statute. F. ConEN, supra note 8, at 222-24. But see Comment, supra note 39,
at 743-45.
59. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1988)), which provides, in pertinent part:
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall
be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided, further,
That nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair
the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with
any such Indian nation or tribe.
Id.
60. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 105-07.
61. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 22 n.1 (G. Warren ed. 1934).
62. F. ConmN, supra note 8, at 60-61.
63. Id. at 107,'127. The Salt River Pima-Maricopa reservation was established by
the Act of February 28, 1859, which "appropriated $10,000 in gifts and $1,000 for a
boundary survey for the Pima and Maricopa in recognition of their assistance to the
United States travelers and explorers in their territory." 64,000 acres were set aside for
their reservation. R. DEMAun, A PrAk AND MARICOPA CHRONOLOGY 1-3 (1946). An
1883 executive order set aside the lands of the present reservation, incorporating lands
assigned under the 1859 Act and executive orders of 1876, 1879 and 1882, totaling
350,026 acres. Executive Order, Nov. 15, 1883, reprinted in I C. KAPPLER, INDIAN
AFFA RS: LAWS & TRnATMEs 808 (2d ed. 1904).
64. Assimilation was not a new ideology. It had been propagated by many prom-
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to extend to Indians all laws that applied to anglos. 6" Despite
this goal, the exception to federal jurisdiction over intraracial
Indian crimes, inadvertently omitted in the 1873 revision, was
reinstated in the 1875 Trade and Intercourse Act. 66 Also, a
predecessor to the Major Crimes Act 7 was rejected by Congress
in 1874 because it conflicted with tribal jurisdiction. 6
The Supreme Court's ruling in Ex parte Crow Dog9 galva-
nized the assimilationist political forces. The Crow Dog Court
overturned a territorial court murder conviction against Crow
Dog, a Brule Sioux who killed another tribal member. In denying
the authority of the federal court to punish Indian-against-Indian
crimes, the Court acknowledged that the tribe retained their self-
government to maintain "order and peace among their own
members." 70 Furthermore, the "bad man" clause, article I in
the treaty, did not operate to invoke federal jurisdiction.7' Thus,
Crow Dog was only subject to traditional tribal law which
required restitution 2
inent government officials. Assimilation was officially sanctioned as early as the Act of
March 3, 1819, titled "[a]n Act making the provision for civilization of the Indian
Tribis adjoined the frontier settlements." F. ComeN, supra note 8, at 121. See INDIAN
Pouoy, supra note 37, at 63 (doc. no. 47, an extract from the Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1832); id. at 89-95 (doc. no. 62, an extract from
the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1856).
.55. F. Co:EN, supra note 8, at 128. See, e.g., INVnaN PoucY, supra note 37, at
144-46 (doc. no. 87, an extract from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs for 1874).
66. Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318. See Clinton, Development of
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARiz. L. REv.
951, 962 n.67 (1975).
67. See infra note 69.
68. S. RE . No. 367, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. (1874). See M. PRICE & R. CLzNTON,
supra note 28, at 206 n.2. See also Harring, Crow Dog's Case: A Chapter in the Legal
History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INIDnAN L. Ray. 191, 223-24 (1990).
69. 109 U.S. 556 (1882).
'70. F. Co;EN, supra note 8, at 250 n.1 (citing Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568). For
a historical review of Crow Dog, see generally Harring, supra note 68.
'71. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567-68. The "bad man" clause was inserted in many
treaties, allowing the federal government jurisdiction over white and Indian criminals.
In pertinent part, this clause states:
If bad men among the Whites, or among other people subject to the
authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong upon the person
or property of the Indians, the United States will, upon proof made to
the agent and forwarded to the commissioner of Indian affairs at Wash-
ington City, proceed at once to cause the offender to be arrested and
punished according to the laws of the United States, and also reimburse
the injured person for the loss.
Id. at 563.
72. Harring, supra note 68, at 199.
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Consequently, the Attorney General in the following year
advised that an Indian must be set free for murdering an Indian
of a different tribe on a third tribe's land, unless one of the
tribes could find jurisdiction. The federal government had no
jurisdiction.7 3
Capitalizing on public sentiment from Crow Dog 4 and inten-
sive lobbying effort by the assimilationists, Congress enacted the
Federal Major Crimes Act.75 The Act provided for concurrent
federal jurisdiction with Indian tribes76 over seven enumerated
crimes occurring in Indian Country, regardless of race.7 7 Tribes
73. 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 567 (1884).
74. Harring, supra note 68, at 192-96. While most authorities write that the Major
Crime Act was due to "public outrage," Harring found little. Rather, there appeared
to be an orchestrated campaign on the part of the bureaucracy to gain control over the
reservations.
75. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385, which provided:
That immediately upon and after the date of the passage of this act all
Indians committing against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder, manslaughter,
rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny within any
Territory of the United States, and either within or without an Indian
reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of such Territory relating
to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor in the same courts and in the
same manner and shall be subject to the same penalties as are all other
persons charged with the commission of said crimes, respectively; and the
said courts are hereby given jurisdiction in all such cases; and all such
Indians committing any of the above crimes against the person or property
of another Indian or other person within the boundaries of the United
States, and within the limits of any Indian reservation, shall be subject to
the same laws, tried in the same courts and in the same manner, and
subject to the same penalties as are all other persons committing any of
the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
76. Concurrent jurisdiction is supported by legislative history. In amending the
1885 bill to delete the words "and not otherwise" from the phrase, "shall be tried
therefor in the same courts and in the same manner and not otherwise," the sponsor
explained:
The effects of this modification will be to give the courts of the United
States concurrent jurisdiction with the Indian courts in the Indian country.
But if these words be not struck out, all jurisdiction of these offenses will
be taken from the existing tribunal of the Indian country. I think it
sufficient that the courts of the United States should have concurrent
jurisdiction in these cases.
16 CoNo. REc. 934 (1885), reprinted in M. PRICE & R. CLiNoN, supra note 28, at
206. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), appears to confin concurrent jurisdiction
by sustaining the murder conviction of a Cherokee in the Cherokee Nation court. See
also F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 339-41.
77. Currently the Act covers 14 crimes. Section 1153 provides in part:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian
or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, man-
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continue to have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian-against-Indian
minor crimes.7 8
The Supreme Court justified this intrusion into the internal
powers of the tribe, citing the tribe's dependent status as ward
of the United States, dependent on the United States even for
its "political rights." ' 79 From this relationship arose the govern-
ment's plenary power over Indian affairs and its duty to protect
the Indians.80 However, despite federal plenary power over In-
dian affairs and specific statute authority, Indian jurisdiction
over minor Indian against Indian crimes was not taken away by
act or implication.
Assimilation and Reorganization
The Dawes General Allotment Act8 brought assimilation into
full legal force. It was enacted with the purpose of ultimately
dissolving Indian tribes and reservations.8 2 The Act allotted
reservation land to each tribal member under a twenty-five year
trusteeship; the remainder was sold to non-Indians.83 At the end
slaughter, kidnapping, rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife,
who has not attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit
rape, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery,
and larceny within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws
and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
78. Taylor, Criminal Jurisdiction, in MANUAL FOR INDIAN LAw at D-2, D-4 (1976).
79. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
80. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85. The Court stated:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It
must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theatre [sic] of its exercise is within the geographical limits of
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it along
can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
Id. at 384. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (plenary authority
over txibal relations of Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and
has always been deemed political, not subject to control by the judiciary). While this
power may be plenary, it is not absolute. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamoks,
329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality opinion). See M. PRICE & R. CLINToN, supra note 28,
at 131-34.
81. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
82. M. PRICE & R. CrINTON, supra note 28, at 78.
83. Allotment was not a new idea; it was written into several treaties. E.g., INDIAN
PouCY, supra note 37, at 88 (reprint of Treaty with the Oto and Missouri Indians).
Allotment was also proposed by several Indian Commissioners. Id. at 147, 153, 155.
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of the trusteeship a patent in fee was to be issued and the state
would assume all jurisdiction.84
The Dawes Act did not apply to the Indian Territory. How-
ever, later legislation allotted the Indian Territory land and
suspended tribal governments in anticipation of Oklahoma state-
hood." Significantly, the Oklahoma Organic Act gave the Okla-
homa Territory jurisdiction over intertribal crimes but not
intratribal crimes. 6 However, Indians were given a right of
appeal directly to federal court when the dispute involved only
members of different tribes.8 7
The Dawes Act, combined with section 17 of the Oklahoma
Enabling Act, 88 conferred concurrent state and federal criminal
jurisdiction over those cases not exclusive to the federal courts,
when cases involved citizens or members of different, non-
affiliated tribes. 89 Therefore, the Oklahoma Territory tribes lost
their inherent power only because of the specific statutory lan-
guage. 90 Tribes elsewhere, however, retained intertribal jurisdic-
tion.
84. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)). The Act states that "each and every allottee shall have the
benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory
in which they may reside ... ." See Note, Jurisdiction to Zone Indian Reservations,
53 WsH. L. Ra,. 663, 682-83 (1978). During the 47 years of the Act's existence, over
50qo of the tribal land left Indian control. This resulted in a randomly distributed,
checkerboard pattern of Indian and non-Indian ownership that is the hallmark of many
modern reservations. See Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian
Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-18 (1934) (memo of J. Collier) (total Indian land
holdings were cut from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 48,000,000 acres in 1934), reprinted
in D. GETcncs & C. WIInxNSON, supra note 22, at 116-18.
85. M. PIcE & R. CLINTON, supra note 28, at 80. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 26, 1906,
ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137; Act of July 1, 1902, ch., 1375, 32 Stat. 716; Act of July 1,
1902, ch. 1362, 32 Stat. 641; Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1361, 32 Stat. 636; Act of June
28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495; Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861. See generally,
F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 770-96 (ch. 14).
86. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, §§ 12, 30-31, 26 Stat. 88, 94-96.
87. Pipestem, supra note 9, at 24.
88. Act of June 6, 1906, ch. 335, 34 Stat. 267.
89. Pipestem, The Journey from Ex parte Crow Dog to Littlechief A Survey of
Tribal Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction in Western Oklahoma, 6 AM. INDIAN L. Rav. 1,
31 (1978).
90. This is supported by a Solicitor General's opinion written by Cohen. I U.S.
DEP'T OF ma INTERIoR, OPINIoNs oF Tm SoricrroR oF mE DEPARTMENT OF TH INTERIOR
RELATiNo TO INDIAN AFFAIRS 1917-1974, at 1074, 1075 (1979) [hereinafter OPINIONs OF
TH SoucrroR] (opinion dated Sept. 5, 1941). "[Oklahoma state] courts had no juris-
diction on the reservations which they do not have in other states, except possibly for
crimes by Indians against Indians of other tribes (by virtue of the 1890 Act)." Id.
No. 1]
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The result of assimilation was the demise of tribal authority
over the reservation.9' The Interior Department tightened its
control over the lives and property of Indians.9 Federal admin-
istrative courts, 93 or in some cases state courts,9 were substituted
for traditional Indian justice. Assimilation culminated in the
granting of citizenship to Indians in 1924. 91 Subsequently, assim-
ilation was recognized as a failure and Congress enacted the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA),9 to reverse its con-
sequences. The IRA extended the trust periods97 and revived
tribal governments by allowing tribes to enact constitutions and
form governments. 98 Out of the IRA, 161 tribal constitutions
and 131 tribal corporate charters were drafted and approved by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).9
Administratively, tribal criminal jurisdiction over all Indians
was recognized by the federal government. A 1934 Interior
Department decision concluded that the tribes had the respon-
sibility for law and order on the reservation unless it was taken
91. President Theodore Roosevelt described it as "a mighty pulverizing engine to
break up the tribal mass." F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 143.
92. V. DEL oRIA, JR., AmEaicAN INDIAN Poucy IN rnT TwzNTmTH CENTRY 248
(1985).
93. Courts of Indian offenses were started in the late 1800s with regulations
promudgated by the Secretary of the Interior. Indian judges were appointed by agents.
It wa- designed to supplant the tribal governments and to suppress customary and
religious practices. The early courts were thought of as "mere educational and discipli-
nary instrumentalities, by which the government ... is endeavoring to improve and
elevate the condition to these dependent tribes." Currently, the courts operate under
the residual sovereignty of the tribes rather than the federal government. F. CoHEN,
supra note 8, at 239, 251. See generally Riehl & Parker, Tribal Courts, in MANUAL oF
INDIAr LAW A-I, A-2-5 (1976); INDIAN POLiCY, supra note 37, at 186 (doc. no. 115, a
reprint of the federal Rules of Indian Courts issued on Aug. 17, 1892).
94.. See, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (notwithstanding §
1152, state court had exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians on
Indian reservation land within its borders due to a lack of disclaimer in its enabling
legislation). While not specifically due to assimilation, the policy originated in the
political climate and ideology of the time. In McBratney, the Court allowed state
jurisdiction in Indian Country for the first time, despite Marshall's preemption policy
in the Cherokee decisions.
95. Act of June 1, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
96. Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-479 (1988)); Oklahoma Welfare Act of 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (1988)).
97. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
98. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988). For modern criticism that tribal constitutional govern-
ment precludes traditional Indian law, see V. DELORIA, supra note 92; L. FRENCH,
INDIA) AND CRDImIAL JusTcE (1982).
99. M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 28, at 82-84.
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over by the states or the federal government.' °° Also, a 1938
solicitor general's opinion stated that a federally-recognized In-
dian tribal member, not a member of the tribe which owned
the reservation, still was subject to the reservation tribal court,
not state court. 10 1
Additionally, the federal government assumed that tribes had
the power to govern intertribal relationships. 102 In 1941, the
Solicitor General affirmed tribal power to conduct intertribal
relations through the use of intertribal extradition of criminals.
This power was qualified, however, by the fact that tribal police
100. 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934):
Over all lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members
thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of determining
the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain,
to reside therein, and to do business.
It is clear that the original criminal jurisdiction of the Indian tribes has
never been transferred to the state. The principle that a State has no
criminal jurisdiction over offenses involving Indians committed on an
Indian reservation is too well established to require argument.
The basic provision of Federal law with regard to Indian offenses are
found in sections 217 and 218 of the U.S. Code., title 25 [25 U.S.C. sec.
1152].... These provisions recognize that, with respect to crimes com-
mitted by one Indian against the person or property of another, the
jurisdiction of the tribe is plenary.
Responsibility for law and order is therefore squarely on the Indian tribe,
unless this field of jurisdiction has been taken over by the States or the
Federal government.
The difficulty of this situation has prompted agitation for the extension
of Federal or State laws over the Indian country, which has continued for
at least five decades, without success. The propriety of the object sought
is not here in question, but the agitation itself is evidence of the large
area of human conduct which must be left in anarchy if it be held that
tribal authority to deal with such conduct had disappeared. Fortunately,
such tribal authority has been repeatedly recognized by the courts....
Only specific legislation terminating or transferring such jurisdiction can
limit the force of tribal law.
Id. at 50-62 (citations omitted).
101. 1 OPinioNs oF THm SoucrTOR, supra note 90, at 872-73 (opinion dated Feb. 17,
1938, stating that unaffiliated Indians are subject to the jurisdiction of state court;
affiliate-members of federal recognized tribes are subject to tribal jurisdiction); id. at
849 (opinion dated Aug. 26, 1938, stating that Indian court has no jurisdiction over
non-ward Indians).
102. Article VI, § l(a) of the Hopi Constitution, which was approved by the BIA,
gave the Tribal Council authority to speak and negotiate for the tribe with federal,
states and local governments and other tribes. HoPi CONST. art. VI, § l(a). But see
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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had no authority to hold a fugitive outside of reservation bound-
aries.1°m Only extradition between tribes where the reservations
are contiguous was legal.'" Consequently, because the power to
conduct intertribal relations has been recognized by the federal
government, and because if the power to conduct external re-
lations has been terminated, this power must be a part of the
internal powers of a tribe.
Moreover, tribal constitutions, promulgated pursuant to BIA
guidelines and subject to BIA approval, contained provisions
recognizing jurisdiction over all Indians within reservation
boundaries. 05 The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Constitution rec-
ognized the tribal power "to lay down criminal and civil codes
of ordinances governing the conduct of members of the Com-
munity and nonmember Indians of the Community."' 10 6 There-
fore, at a minimum, both federal and tribal governments
conducted their actions under the assumption that the tribes
retained criminal jurisdiction over minor crimes involving Indi-
ans of federally-recognized tribes. 07
Termination and Public Law 280
Quickly, criticism of the newly-revived tribal powers led to a
call for termination of tribal status. 108 Several events occurred
103. I OPINIONS OF Ta SOLICITOR, supra note 90, at 1066-67 (opinion dated Aug.
14, 1941, written by F. Cohen). See e.g., 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 440 (1886) (power of tribal
police, employed to maintain order and prevent illegal liquor traffic, does not extend
beyond reservation border).
104. 1 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR, supra note 90, at 1067 (opinion dated Aug. 14,
1941).
105. One criticism lodged against the BIA was that "the constitutions prepared by
the Indian Bureau officials for adoption by the Indians were so filled with the impositions
of the Department that there was little room for the ideas of the Indians, yet the
constitutions were supposed to be Indian-made." Hearings on S. 2103 Before the
Committee on Indian Affairs, H.R. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), reprinted in M. PRICE
& R. CLINTON, supra note 25, at 81-82.
105. SALT RrvER PnhA-MARICOPA CONST. art. V, § 2(k), reprinted in IV CHIARTERS,
CONSTrrTIONS, AND BY-LAws OF THE INDIAN TRIEs OF NORTH AmERICA 55-56 (G. Fay,
ed. 1967). The constitution was approved by the Indian Comm'r on May 17, 1940, and
by the Assistant Interior Secretary on June 11, 1940.
107. That is exactly the situation in Duro.
103. See supra note 99. The hearing summary concluded with the following:
Fundamentally the so-called Wheeler-Howard Act attempts to set up a
state or a nation within a nation which is contrary to the intents and
purposes of the American Republic. No doubt but that the Indians should
be helped and given every assistance possible but in no way should they
be set up as a governing power within the United States of America. They
shall be permitted to have a part in their own affairs as to government in
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to strip reorganized tribes of their power and legal existence.
During the 1940s, statutes were enacted giving jurisdiction over
specific reservations to the states. 109 Further encroachment came
in 1946, when the Supreme Court extended the Assimilative
Crimes Act of 1825110 to Indian Country.' The Act incorporated
state law into the federal criminal code as a supplement to those
federal criminal laws applicable to federal enclaves, which in-
cludes Indian Country. 12 During the 1950s, Congress enacted
statutes to terminate specific tribes, subjecting them to state
authority."3
Additionally, Public Law 83-280,114 as enacted, transferred
some elements of criminal and civil jurisdictional power over
Indians to the states."' Public Law 280 granted criminal juris-
the same way as any domestic organization exists within a State or Com-
monwealth but not to be independent or apart therefrom.
Id. See M. PRICE & R. CuNToN, supra note 28, at 81-82. See generally F. CoHEN,
supra note 8, at 152-80.
109. M. PRICE & R. CLwrroN, supra note 28, at 85-86. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 13,
1950, ch. 947, § 1, 64 Stat. 845 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 233 (1988)); Act of July 2,
1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224, (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1988)) (§§ 232, 233 granted
civil and criminal jurisdiction to New York state over all reservations within state); Act
of Oct. 5, 1949, ch. 604, 63 Stat. 705 (civil and criminal jurisdiction over Agua Caliente
Reservation in California); Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Sac and Fox
Reservation in Iowa); Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229 (Devil's Lake
Reservation in North Dakota); Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1988)) (all reservations in Kansas).
110. Ch. 65, 4 Stat. 115 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 13, (1982)) which provides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter
reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any
act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment
of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the
jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such
place situated, by the, laws thereof in force at the time of such act or
omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
Ill. Williams v. United States, 372 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1946). Cf. F. CoHEN, supra
note 8, at 290-94 (questioning the validity of the application of § 13 to Indian Country).
112. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 164.
113. M. PIcE & R. CLINTON, supra note 28, at 86. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 13, 1954,
ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1988)); Act of June 17, 1954, ch.
303, 68 Stat. 250 (Menominee); Act of Sept. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-629, 76 Stat. 429
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 971 (1988)) (Ponca). In all, approximately 109 tribes were
terminated, affecting 11,466 members and 3.2% of trust land. Id.
114. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1976)); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976).
115. Mandatory states include California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wis-
consin. Alaska was later added. Eight states which had disclaimers in their constitutions
were given permission to repeal the disclaimer, and any other state not having jurisdiction
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diation over offenses by or against Indians to the same extent
as the state's jurisdiction outside Indian Country. 16 The legis-
lation enacting Public Law 280 specifically provided that the
Indian Major Crimes Act and the Assimilative Crimes Act do
not apply to areas subject to the new law." 7
Yet tribes did not lose all of their power through termination.
Public Law 280 states have been precluded from exercising
regulatory jurisdiction over the tribes."" Also, tribal jurisdiction
remains concurrent with the state to the same extent that it is
concurrent with the federal government." 9 Additionally, the fed-
eral government continues to recognize tribal constitutions as
the source of tribal power.'22 So tribes could assert criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians if allowed by tribal con-
stitutions. Therefore, many tribes survived this period without
severe encroachment on their autonomy.
Self-Determination
Termination was recognized as a failure by the end of the
1950s. Beginning with the Kennedy Administration, new policies
were formulated and legislation enacted for self-determination,
human and natural resource development on the reservation,
and restoration of rights.' 21 The most important legislation from
over Indians could obtain jurisdiction by passing affirmative legislation. Oklahoma is a
disclaimer state that failed to repeal its disclaimer. See also F. COHEN, supra note 8, at
362-72; Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indiar, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535 (1975); Note, Washington's Public Law 280 Juris-
diction on Indian Reservation, 53 WASH. L. REv. 701 (1978). Ten optional states accepted
some degree of jurisdiction: Arizona (air and water pollution only); Florida (full Public
Law 2F:0); Idaho (over seven subject areas and full Public Law 280 with tribal consent);
Iowa,'(ivil jurisdiction over Sac and Fox reservation); Montana (criminal jurisdiction
over Flathead Reservation); Nevada (full Public Law 280, but retroceded for most
reservations); North Dakota (civil only subject to tribal consent); South Dakota (criminal
and civil causes of actions arising on the highways, but subsequently invalidated by the
state supreme court); Utah (post-1968 statute accepting jurisdiction on tribal consent);
and Washington (full Public Law 280 over Indians on non-trust land and limited
jurisdicaon on trust land to only eight subject areas). F. CoREN, supra note 8, at 362-
63 n.125.
116. 1 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1988). See 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988); CoimN, supra note
8, at 365.
117. F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 365.
118. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 (1976).
119. F. Comm, supra note 8, at 367.
120. II OPIoNs op ma SoucrroR, supra note 90 at 1637 (opinion dated May 7,
1954, stating that a tribe cannot assert jurisdiction and levy criminal sanctions against
nonmember only because ordinance did not comport with tribal constitution).
121. F. COemeN, supra note 8, at 181-88.
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this period is the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),'2 which limits
the conduct of the tribe toward its members by extending to the
tribes many of the provisions found in the Bill of Rights.'1'
Among those protections afforded to tribal members are due
process and equal protection rights. Criminal penalties are lim-
ited to six months imprisonment and a $500 fine. The ICRA
does not extend first amendment protections, nor does it guar-
antee a right to a grand jury indictment or counsel except at
the defendants' own expense.'12 The ICRA ends unilateral state
assumption of Public Law 280 jurisdiction and allows those
states which assumed jurisdiction to retrocede it back to the
federal government.'12 However, no provision limits the tribe
from exercising criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
Therefore, in reviewing the historical relationship between the
federal government and the Indians, an underlying premise has
been that tribes retained criminal jurisdiction over minor crimes
committed by nonmember Indians unless specifically preempted
by federal statute, or unless the tribal constitution limited the
jurisdiction of the tribe. Nothing in this history reversed this
premise, until Duro.
Statement of the Case
The Duro decision arose from a conflict between rulings of
the Ninth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals. In 1987, the
Ninth Circuit held in Duro v. Reina'26 that a tribe had criminal
jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian. In May, 1988, the Eighth
Circuit ruled, in Greywater v. Joshua,'27 against a tribal court
retaining criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian. One
month later, the Ninth Circuit revised its prior opinion, still
holding for jurisdiction. 2 A rehearing was subsequently de-
nied. 129
Albert Duro is an enrolled member of the Torrez-Martinez
Band of Mission Indians. He lived on the Salt River reservation
122. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)).
123. West, Jr., Tribal Powers, in MANUAL oF IzNAm_ LAw A-3 (1976). Prior to the
ICRA, courts generally held that specific provisions of the Constitution did not apply
to Indian tribes. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (fifth amendment does
not apply to the Cherokee Nation).
124. F. CoHEMN, supra note 8, at 203.
125. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988).
126. 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987).
127. 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
128. 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988).
129. 860 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1988).
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with his girlfriend, who is a member of the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community. He worked for the Community's
construction company. On June 18, 1984, criminal complaints
against Duro were filed in the Community's tribal court and in
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In
tribal court, Duro was charged with one misdemeanor count of
discharge of a firearm within the reservation boundary. He was
charged in district court with murder and aiding and abetting
murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1111, 1153. The basis for each
charge was the shooting and killing of a fourteen-year-old en-
rolled member of the Gila River Indian Tribe.
Subsequent to his arrest, the grand jury indictment against
Duro for first degree murder was dismissed without prejudice
in district court on a motion by the United States. Duro was
placed in the custody of the Salt River Department of Public
Safety. Edward Reina was the Community's Chief of Police.
Duro's motion to dismiss for lack of criminal jurisdiction was
dendied in tribal court on October 19, 1985. Duro petitioned the
district court for a writ of habeas corpus and/or a writ of
prohibition. In granting the writ, the district court found that
the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonmember was an imper-
missible violation of equal protection under the ICRA.130
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. In
its revised decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that despite the
language of Oliphant, Congress would have explicitly divested
the tribes of jurisdiction over nonmembers if it had intended to
do so. Thus, without explicit divestiture, the tribes retained
crimrinal jurisdiction over Indian-against-Indian crimes without
regard to membership.' 31 The court further rejected Duro's equal
protection claim, stating that due to his tribal membership in
another tribe and significant contacts with this tribe, criminal
jurisdiction was not based upon an impermissible racial classi-
fication. Further, a rational basis existed for the extension of
jurisdiction over nonmembers. 3 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court was presented with the issue
of whether an Indian tribe had criminal jurisdiction over a
nomnember Indian. Consequently, the Court held that tribal
courts have no criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.'3
13D. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2058.
131. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1136.
132. Id.
133. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2056.
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Decision of the Case
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 134 began his analysis
by adopting the rationales of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe"'35 and United States v. Wheeler 36 to support the holding. 37
Wheeler specifically held that a tribe "cannot try nonmembers
in tribal courts."' 38 While full territorial sovereignty includes the
power to enforce all laws against all that come within its border,
tribes are limited sovereigns.139 Tribes retain only the power
needed to control internal relations, and preserve customs and
social order."'4 Enforcement of internal criminal laws necessarily
involves only relations among members.' 4' Relations between an
Indian tribe and a nonmember have been implicitly divested,
due to the tribe's dependent status. 142
Despite the fact that tribes have greater retained power in
exercising civil jurisdiction, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
is unlike civil jurisdiction, which usually arises through consen-
sual relationships of property ownership, commercial dealings,
contracts, leases, or other relationships. 143 Rather, criminal ju-
risdiction involves a direct intrusion on personal liberties.' 44
Thus, Indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over nonmem-
ber Indians.
The argument that historical evidence supports tribal jurisdic-
tion was rejected. Broad statute and program definitions, case
law, and Court of Indian Offenses jurisdiction that do not
distinguish between Indians, at most, show a past tendency to
treat Indians as an undifferentiated class. 45 Quoting from Wash-
ing v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
Justice Kennedy wrote that falling within the definition of Indian
for purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act does not evidence
congressional intent to exempt Indians from state taxation.'"
134. Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Blackmun, Stevens, 0 'Connor and Scalia, J.J.,
joined in the decision.
135. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
136. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
137. Duro, 110S. Ct. at 2058.
138. Id. at 2059 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
139. Id. at 2060.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
143. Id. at 2061 (quoting United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2062.
146. Id. (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980)).
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Similarly, it does not sustain criminal jurisdiction over Indians. 147
Historically, the federal government gave little attention to in-
tertribal matters.'14 Additionally, notwithstanding the solicitor
general's opinion which supported tribal jurisdiction over mem-
bers, evidence of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is not
clear. Taken as a whole, Kennedy found that the opinions do
not support external criminal jurisdiction as part of the modern
tribal court function. 149
Kennedy stated that Duro is a United States citizen. Despite
this status, Congress has a right to legislate regarding benefits
and burdens for Indians as a class. Absent such legislation,
however, Indians, like all other citizens, are protected from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberties." 0 Since a
criminal trial is a serious intrusion on personal liberty, the Court
refused to treat nonmembers differently from non-Indian citi-
zens. An Indian tribe derives its power from the consent of its
members, and that consent delimits tribal power.'
Kennedy noted that the Constitution does not extend to tribal
governments. The ICRA does not afford full constitutional
protections to a defendant in tribal court, including a right to
counsel for indigent defendants.. Also, tribal courts are often
subject to tribal governments and- to unspoken customs and
practices.5 2 Further, case law suggests that there is a limit on
Congress' ability to subject citizens to tribal courts that do not
guarantee full constitutional protections. Congress has not del-
egated authority to criminally try nonmembers, and thus tribes
have no criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.'
Kennedy stated that tribes enjoy greater power over members
than any other governmental body in the U.S. because the Bill
of Rights does not extend to tribal governments. Thus, this is
one more reason to deny jurisdiction over those who have not
given their consent to be governed.5 4 Enrollment in another
tribe is not enough to implicate jurisdiction because tribes are
not mere fungible groups. Wide variations of customs, language,
and history separate these groups. Thus, consent to jurisdiction
by membership in one tribe does not imply consent to submit
147. Id.
143. Id.
149. Id. at 2063.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2063-64.
152. Id. at 2064 (quoting F. CoHEN, supra note 8, at 334-35).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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to another's jurisdiction. 5' Finally, any jurisdictional void cre-
ated by this decision is a void of convenience. Therefore, it is
for Congress, not the Court, to address the problem of a
potential jurisdictional void. 56
Justice Brennan dissented, writing that tribal powers are in-
herent sovereign powers, subject to complete defeasance by
Congress. Until Congress acts, however, tribes retain all aspects
of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by impli-
cation of their dependent status. 157 Tribes have no inherent power
to enter into direct diplomatic or commercial relations with a
foreign nation. 58 They are implicitly divested of their power
over external relations because of the overriding interests of the
federal government. 5 9
Tribes retain the power to prescribe and enforce internal
criminal laws, Brennan stated.' 6° While they lost criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians, tribes have not necessarily lost criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.' 6' Oliphant cannot be read
to divest tribes of jurisdiction over all nonmembers because the
analysis was only based on Congressional action in relation to
non-Indians. 62 The language cited by the majority from Wheeler
was only a misstatement of the holding in Oliphant. Any pro-
nouncement regarding the lack of jurisdiction over nonmembers
was dicta. 63
Brennan also contended that Indians gave up their power to
try non-Indians, except in a manner acceptable to Congress, by
submitting to the government's overriding sovereignty. However,
consideration of the statutes shows that the tribes were not
similarly divested of jurisdiction over nonmembers. 64 In 18
U.S.C. § 1152,165 Indian-against-Indian crime was explicitly ex-
empted from federal jurisdiction.'6 Title 18 U.S.C. § 1153 was
155. Id. at 2064-65.
156. Id. at 2066.
157. Id. at 2066-67 (Brennen, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978)).
158. Id. at 2067 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832)).
159. Id. (quoting Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3019 (1989)).
160. Id. (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2067-68.
163. Id. at 2067 n.1.
164. Id. at 2068.
165. For the history of this statute, see supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
166. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2068.
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enacted in response to Ex parte Crow Dog,167 which found no
federal jurisdiction. Section 1153 gave the federal courts juris-
diction over certain interracial crimes. Thus, in Oliphant, the
Court found implicit divestiture of tribal jurisdiction due to
these positive acts. However, the opposite is true for nonmember
Indcians. 16
Consistently, Congress has exempted Indian-against-Indian
crimes, Brennan stated. This infers that the tribes retain juris-
diction over all Indians. 169 The majority's argument that the
federal statute is not dispositive on the question of tribal power
is inconsistent with the Oliphant pronouncement that the statutes
evidenced the 'commonly held presumption' that the tribes
ceded their power over non-Indians."'' 70 By refusing to draw this
inference, the majority has created a jurisdictional void. This
void is relevant to discerning Congressional intent, not for find-
ing jurisdiction.'17 Treaties and statutes must be read in light of
the common notions and assumptions of the day. By not dif-
ferentiating between members and nonmembers, it can be logi-
cally assumed that Congress did not view tribal power as limited
only to tribal members. 72
In responding to Kennedy's argument that tribal jurisdiction
over citizens is inconsistent with tribal dependent status, Brennan
noted that in Oliphant, tribes, in submitting to the overriding
federal sovereignty, gave up all jurisdiction over non-Indians,
except that which is acceptable to Congress. Thus, it is not
citizenship but the acceptability to Congress which subjects one
to tribal jurisdiction. 7 3 Also, while prosecution of non-Indians
is unacceptable to Congress, prosecution of all Indians in tribal
court is acceptable. 7 4
Finally, if implicitly divested of jurisdiction over citizens who
are nonmembers, then the tribes also also are divested implicitly
of jurisdiction over members, Brennan'stated. 17 Participation in
tribal government does not constitute a knowing waiver of
constitutional rights. 76 Consent to jurisdiction due to tribal
167. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
163. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
169. Id. at 2069.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2070.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2071.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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government participation has never been a prerequisite for civil
jurisdiction, nor is participation in the political process a pre-
requisite for criminal jurisdiction by a sovereign. 177
Analysis
The Duro decision is a logical extension of the Court's con-
tinued reduction of tribal court jurisdiction. The basis for Duro
is Oliphant and Wheeler, both of which have been criticized178
for diverging from accepted Indian precedent. It is not logical
to infer that criminal jurisdiction was withdrawn over nonmem-
ber Indians because it was withdrawn statutorily over non-
Indians. It is not doubted that the Court meant to include
nonmember Indians in its development of the divestiture doc-
trine. But using dicta to broaden the holding of Oliphant does
not make this expansion precedent or good law.
In determining whether minor crimes jurisdiction over non-
Indians had been withdrawn, the Oliphant Court ignored the
lower court's use of the traditional preemption analysis 179 and
177. Id.
178. Clinton, State Power Over Indian Reservations: A Critical Comment on the
Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. REv. 434 (1981). Clinton wrote:
The decisions of the Burger Court ... have almost destroyed ... Mar-
shall's analytical framework. The recent cases have ignored the intent of
the Indian commerce clause and authorized substantial state jurisdiction
over non-Indians and even some state power over Indians in Indian
country. Moreover, the... opinions have failed to replace Worcester with
any clear analytical test, leaving in their wake a turbulent backwater of
confusing decisions that necessarily engender not only further litigation
but on-going tension between the states and the Indian tribes.
Id. at 439-40. See also Fetzer, Jurisdictional Decisions in Indian Law: The Importance
of Extralegal Factors In Judicial Decision Making, 9 Am. INDxw L. Rnv. 253, 272
(1981) (In 10 out of 11 cases decided between 1973 and 1982, demographics played a
part in the decisions; the greater the ratio of non-Indians to Indians involved, the
greater the chance the court will rule in the non-Indians' favor despite precedent).
179. Preemption is based on the exercise of constitutional authority from the com-
merce clause coupled with the supremacy clause of article VI, clause 2. D. GTrrcHs &
C. W RsON, supra note 22, at 332. Preemption was first outlined by J. Marshall:
The Cherokee nation then is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity
with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between
the United States and this nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested
in the government of the United States.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832). Subsequent decisions have
upheld this doctrine. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1885). See
also Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribe, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959) ("Indian
tribes are not states. They have a status higher than that of states. They are subordinate
and dependent nations possessed of all powers as such only to the extent that they have
expressly been required to surrender them by the superior sovereign, the United States.")
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held that while treaty provisions by themselves would not be
sufficient to divest the tribe of all criminal jurisdiction, "prec-
edent satisfies us that even ignoring treaties and congressional
policy, Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power from Con-
gress."19 The Court used dependent status language found in
several cases to infer no inherent power without delegation. 8,
However, delegation of inherent sovereign power before it can
be exercised is inapposite to prior case law'82 and legal authority
such as Cohen, cited only two weeks later by this Court in
Wheeler: "The power of Indian tribes are ... inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."'183
Because the power over minor crimes has never been withdrawn
or extinguished by Congress, under traditional analysis, the tribe
should retain that power.
Despite this authority, the Oliphant Court, supporting its
decision with the dissent from Fletcher v. Peck,'14 held that as
a general principle, "[b]y submitting to the overriding sover-
eignty of the United States Indian tribes therefore necessarily
give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United
States except in a manner acceptable to Congress."' 85 Thus,
Indians were divested of all sovereign power over non-Indians. 18 6
The Wheeler Court, using the divestiture doctrine, held that
there was no double jeopardy involved in the concurrent federal
and Indian prosecution arising out of a rape committed on the
Navajo reservation. 1' Tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction
over a member was done as a part of its retained inherent power
and not as an adjunct of the federal government.' But those
areas of sovereignty implicitly divested by virtue of their de-
pendent status involve relations between members and nonmem-
180. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (emphasis added).
181. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-52, 554; United States v. Rogers,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (1846); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886).
182. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896).
183. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327 (1978) (quoting F. CoIEN, supra
note 8, at 122) (emphasis in original).
184. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
18:5. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 207.
186. Note, Zoning: Controlling Land Use on the Checkerboard: The Zoning Powers
of Indian Tribes After Montana v. United States, 10 AM. INDN L. Rv. 187, 198
(1982).
187. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 314-16.
1811. Id. at 328.
240 [Vol. 16
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bers.189 This mischaracterization of the Oliphant holding has
been used by the Court to further its divestiture policy when in
fact the holding pertained only to non-Indians. Thus Duro rests
upon a questionable foundation.
History cannot be ignored nor revised. The tradition of sov-
ereignty is the backdrop against which applicable treaties and
statutes must be read. 9' Historically, Duro is unsupportable.
Jurisdiction over minor crimes committed by nonmember Indi-
ans has never been statutorily withdrawn. Through treaties and
legislation such as the Major Crimes Act,191 only the inherent
tribal power to try non-Indians and Indians for major crimes
in tribal courts has been withdrawn.'9
Intertribal relations issues are not new. Several treaties ex-
plicitly addressed intertribal affairs, granting jurisdiction to the
federal government.1 93 Outside of these treaties, several solicitor
general opinions have specifically found no federal jurisdiction
over intertribal crimes. 94 A basic premise of Indian law has
been that tribes retain power unless specifically preempted. The
common understanding has been that the federal government
had no general jurisdiction over intertribal crimes. 95 Without
preemption, the tribes retain jurisdiction over nonmember In-
dians.
As the dissent correctly pointed out, the broad definition of
"Indian" is not dispositive on the issue of jurisdiction. Rather,
it supports a congressional presumption that Indians retain that
which is not specifically withdrawn. It is unlikely that Congress
intended to create a jurisdictional void, nor did Congress pre-
sume that jurisdiction was limited to member Indians. 19 Rather,
189. Id. at 316.
Indians can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land the Indians
occupy. They cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental relations
with foreign nations. And, as we have recently held, they cannot try
nonmembers in tribal courts.
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their
freedom independently to determine their external relations.
Id.
190. F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 273.
191. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-1153 (1988).
192. F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 252-57. See generally Taylor, supra note 78;
Bransky, supra note 7.
193. See supra note 37.
194. See supra note 97.
195. See supra notes 53, 69-77, 97-98, and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 97.
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treaties and statutes have been construed to uphold the right of
self-government. When construing the intent of the IRA and
other statutes with broad definitional bases, the recognition of
power or the excepting of it always must be read in light of
sovereignty. This implicates retention, not divestiture, of sov-
ereign power.
Further, even though implicit divestiture is the law, and tribes
have been divested of external relations due to their dependent
status, it cannot be assumed that jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians constitutes external relations. Historically and in diplo-
matic parlance, Indians were presumed to have lost their right
to negotiate and treat with foreign governments. 197 The treaty-
making power was inconsistent with tribal dependence because
it interfered with U.S. foreign policy and peace with United
States neighbors. Yet, despite this fact, a few Indian treaties
specifically recognized tribal treaties with foreign governments
and were excepted from the common presumption.'98 Also, until
explicitly divested in 1871, tribes used their external power to
negotiate with the federal government. Even the Wheeler Court,
in explaining Oliphant, stated that external relations historically
were "commercial and governmental relations with foreign gov-
ermnents."l9
Some treaties addressed intertribal disputes and granted to the
federal government the right to mediate these disputes. 200 Most
treaties, however, lacked this specific granting language. Justice
Brennan pointed out that in 1834, Congress rejected a bill that
would have removed all Indians to land west of the Mississippi
River and granted to the federal government the right to punish
intertribal crimes.20' Because it was rejected, it must be presumed
that the tribes retained the right to punish intertribal crimes.
Even the Supreme Court has noted previously that the federal
government does not have jurisdiction over intertribal crimes.20 1
When Congress wanted to divest the tribes of intertribal juris-
197. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
198. See supra note 26.
199. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326. "They cannot enter into direct commercial or
governmental relations worth foreign nations. And, as we have recently held, they
cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts." The juxtaposition of these two could mean
that the jurisdiction over nonmembers is distinct from external relations. Nonetheless,
the latter is a misstatement of Oliphant and has nothing to do with Indians being subject
to juisdiction.
200. See supra note 37.
201. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2069 n.2.
202. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
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diction, they specifically did so, as in the Treaty with the
Cherokees and the Oklahoma Organic Act. This supports a
presumption of retention.
Moreover, the actions of the executive branch show that only
relations with foreign governments were divested, not intertribal
relations. The government has encouraged intertribal compacts
to settle disputes. Tribal constitutions promulgated under the
IRA and approved by the BIA granted tribes the authority to
enter into relationships with federal, states, and local govern-
ments, as well as other tribes.m If external relations that are
"necessarily divested" include intertribal relations, then it is
inconsistent to recognize tribal power to enter into compacts
with any governmental entity, including state and local govern-
ments or other tribes. Likewise, it is also inconsistent to rec-
ognize tribal jurisdiction over anyone but a tribal member. Thus,
it cannot be inferred logically that divestiture of the power over
external relations includes that over nonmember Indians.
A more important, yet no less refutable, argument is that
tribes do not have the power to subject nonmember citizens to
tribal court because of the less than full constitutional protec-
tions provided to a defendant. The Duro Court held that tribal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians conflicts with the overrid-
ing interest of the federal government in protecting its citizens
against unwarranted intrusions on their liberty.214 It is agreed
that constitutional guarantees do not extend to the tribal gov-
ernment. 2°5 The Bill of Rights pertains only to the relationship
between the federal government and its citizens.2 The four-
teenth amendment extended those guarantees to state govern-
ments after the civil war. Prior to that extension, out-of-state
citizens were similarly situated to nonmember Indians. Neither
were able to participate in government. Yet, prior to the four-
teenth amendment, a state court had jurisdiction over out-of-
state U.S. citizens, and could prosecute to the full extent of its
law even though it afforded less than full United States consti-
tutional guarantees. Therefore, in the similarly analogous situ-
203. See supra notes 99-103.
204. It is ironic that this Court appears to be more concerned with form over
substance. One wishes that this Court become as concerned with having effective legal
council in state death penalty cases as they do about having counsel for misdemeanor
tribal trials. What can be more of an unwarranted intrusion than death? For a recent
critique of death penalty representation, see THE NAT'L L.J. 30-44 (June 11, 1990).
205. F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 664 n.l1.
206. Barron v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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ation, a tribe should be able to prosecute a nonmember Indian
without violating the U.S. Constitution.
Second, when constitutionally-guaranteed protections are given
up, it must be knowingly done. As Justice Brennan has asserted,
participation in government is not a prerequisite to the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction.20 Nor can consent to be governed, that
is, being a member, constitute an intelligent and knowing waiver
of constitutional rights.m If one could give up constitutional
protections just by being a citizen, then these protections would
be worthless, because they could be waived without actual
knowledge of waiver.
Finally, consent is irrelevant. Congress has the plenary power
over Indian affairs.2 The majority admits that it is within
Congress' power to grant jurisdiction over nonmember Indi-
ans .210 Therefore, jurisdiction can be granted despite the lack of
consent. This undermines the majority view. While Congress
has clearly legislated that jurisdiction over non-Indians is un-
acceptable, it has not done so with nonmember Indians. The
conclusion must be that jurisdiction is retained.
Discussion
Considering the pronouncements of this Court, Duro was not
unexpected. Duro represents conservative judicial activism,
molding the law away from a broad definition of tribal sover-
eignty to a narrow definition which was not intended by Con-
gress. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have done what the
terminationists and assimilationists in the last hundred years
could not do. Yet with the current Court makeup, the precedent
of the Oliphant, Wheeler and Duro trilogy will not be soon
overruled. Clinton's critique that the Burger Court has almost
destroyed Marshall's analytical framework holds no less true
today for the Rehnquist Court.21'
Nothing more affects the internal peace and prosperity of a
community than lawlessness. It is ironic that this Court has held
that the tribe retains civil jurisdiction over non-Indians when
207. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2071.
208. Id. at 2071 n.4.
209. See supra note 62.
210. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 210 (1978) ("by submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States,
Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the
United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress").
211. See supra note 173.
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their conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.212 Yet the murder of a resident nonmember by another
resident nonmember is not enough to implicate criminal juris-
diction.
Several approaches can be taken to counteract this detour
from traditional preemption analysis. First, Congress can be
lobbied to enact a jurisdictional statute that affirms tribal crim-
inal jurisdiction over nonmembers. This might have a respectable
chance of passage because of the budget constraints at both the
federal and state level. Justice Kennedy's warning-that Con-
gress might not have the authority to subject citizens to juris-
dictions which guarantee less than full protection-should not
govern Indian actions. This is, however, an indication of his
agenda.
Second, Congress could grant full constitutional protections
to defendants in tribal criminal courts through a revision of the
ICRA. Passage would undercut the constitutional protection
argument because jurisdiction would not be inconsistent with
the overriding interests of the federal government in safeguarding
citizens from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberties.
However, this would entail further encroachment on the internal
sovereignty of each tribe's power to select its own form of
government.
Congressional lobbying for a change cannot be done unilat-
erally. The Indian community must come together and form a
consensus on what legislation should be requested. All view-
points need to be represented. A liability with congressional
action is that the tribes could get more than they wanted because
of the varied political interests involved. The resulting legislation
might encroach further on autonomy rather than reaffirm it.
Therefore, any request to Congress must be carefully planned
by the full tribal community.
Third, tribes can enter into compacts with other tribes ex-
changing jurisdictional reciprocity. In this way, each tribal mem-
ber will have consented to jurisdiction through their participation
in their own tribal government, at least under the Duro analysis.
This might be a workable short-term solution because it would
include more nonmembers within jurisdiction than this decision
allows.
A less desirable alternative from the viewpoint of tribal au-
tonomy would be granting jurisdiction to the states under Public
212. United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
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Law 280. This is less desirable because it allows a termination
era. law to intrude further on sovereignty. Even if granted, the
states might not want jurisdiction because of their own fiscal
constraints. Then, the legal void would continue.
An even less desirable alternative would be closing tribal
borders and ejecting all nonmember Indians. Many nonmember
Indians live and work on the reservations. They have strong ties
to the tribe through marriage and community involvement. They
onIy lack political involvement to be subject to jurisdiction. By
ejecting these nonmembers, the community is further disrupted,
skilled workers are lost, and either families are separated or
spousal members must also leave. While the tribe has the un-
contested right to say who may enter, many federal contracts
and services depend upon a broad definition of who is an Indian,
and denial of access to those services or that job may in fact
be discriminatory.
Alternatively, the tribes can make nonmember Indians mem-
bers of the tribe, based on residence. Tribes have complete
power over who is a member.213 If one is deemed a member,
then there is no problem under Duro. However, this could have
a detrimental effect on tribal resources, and on political and
cultural autonomy. Many benefits accrue to those who are
members only, including sharing in mineral royalties and many
government services. Adding more people to the roles strains an
already taxed system. And if blood quantum is no longer re-
quired, smaller tribes could easily be overwhelmed by those who
are today nonmembers. Member Indians could lose political
control and cultural distinctiveness.
Conclusion
In this era of Supreme Court animosity toward tribal sover-
eignty, the tribes will have to look to Congress rather than the
Courts to protect their inherent sovereign powers. This is ironic
because, for many years, while Congress vacillated between
policies of assimilation and self-determination, the Court has
protected Indian rights against governmental encroachment and
termination. 21 4 Clearly the Rehnquist Court is not the Indians'
protector.
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